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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
DAVINCI'S INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Petitioner, 
-v-
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 17043 
-----------------------------------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
-----------------------------------------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, a restaurant, asks this court to 
review action by the Utah Liquor Control Commission which 
denied petitioner's application to establish a state 
liquor store on petitioner's premises. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
The Utah Liquor Control Commission denied pe-
titioner's application to establish a state liquor store 
on the premises of its restaurant. 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent, Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
requests this court to uphold the Conrrnission's action of 
April 11, 1980, whereby petitioner's application to es-
tablish a state liquor store on its premises was denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent disagrees substantially with petitioner' 
characterization of the facts in this matter and therefore 
submits its own statement of the facts as to the pertinent 
matters at hand. 
Davinci's Inc., hereinafter referred to as pe-
titioner or restaurant, is a restaurant located in a small 
shopping center at 2020 East 3300 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
Application was made by petitioner for establish~ 
ment of a restaurant state liquor store to sell liquor at 
petitioner's place of business. In verifying the information 
furnished in the application it was found that the Evergreen 
Junior High School was situated adjacent to the shopping 
center on the south. Measurements were taken in a straight 
line from the school and the restaurant was found to be at 
a distance of 540 feet from the main school entrance, 525 
feet from the nearest school building wall, 360 feet from 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the school playground fence, and 330 feet from the school 
parking lot. (See affidavit of Joe R. Coccimiglio in 
respondent's supplemental designation of record.) 
It was also discovered that the fence between 
the school and the shopping center was opened and rolled 
back for a distance of approximately 15 feet, providing 
direct access between the school property and the shopping 
center, generally along the straight line between the school 
main entrance and petitioner's main entrance. 
On April 11, 1980, the Commission in a regular 
meeting considered the application, heard statements from 
counsel and a representative for the restaurant and then 
disapproved the restaurant's application for establishment 
of a state store. Petitioner challenges that disapproval 
on the sole basis that the Commission did not properly 
define the term "radius" as used in the 600 foot pro-
hibition in the state law and therefore improperly denied 
petitioner's application. 
The Utah Liquor Control Commission thus dis-
approved petitioner's application for establishment of a 
restaurant state liquor store, and petitioner now asks 
this court to direct the Commission to approve and establish 
a state store on the premises of its restaurant operation. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WORD "RADIUS" IN UTAH LAW CLEARLY 
CALLS FOR A MEASUREMENT ALONG A STRAIGHT 
LINE. 
Nowhere does petitioner contend that the refusal 
to establish a state liquor store was in any manner arbitrary 
or capricious or beyond the authority granted to the Liquor 
Commission under the law. The sole basis upon which petitioner's 
complaint of the Commission's refusal lies is that the Com-
mission did not correctly define the word "radius" as used in 
the law: 
No state store or package agency 
shall be established within a radius 
of 600 feet of any public or private 
school, church, library, public play-
ground or park .... Section 32-1-36.15 
(2) (a), Utah Code Annotated. 
Thus, where the Commission applied the word "radius" 
in terms of a straight line measurement, petitioner contends 
that the interpretation should be in terms of ordinary pedestrian 
traffic or shortaet walking distance. Such an interpretation 
of "radius" as the shortest practical route of circuitous travel 
is clearly incorrect and contrary to Utah law. 
Petitioner cites the recent Utah case of Celebrity Club 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 1689 (1979) as 
authority for a "sensible and practical construction" of 
Section 32-1-36.15(2) (a), Utah Code Annotated. Petitioner 
-4-
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urges this court to be reasonable by avoiding a literal or 
geometric construction of the law. 
But this court in the Celebrity Club Case, clarified 
in depth the meaning of the language of Section 16-6-13.5, 
Utah Code Annotated, regarding the protected are~ the licensed 
area and the required distance in between the two. Even though 
that case dealt with Title 16 the following language clearly 
is dispositive of the issues at hand under Title 32: 
A "radius is defined as a line segment 
extending from the center of a circle 
or sphere to the curve or surface. 
* * * 
In Sachs v. Legg, (1920) 219 Ill. App. 144 ... , 
the court said that a radius is a straight 
line from the center of a circle or sphere 
to its periphery or surface, and a periphery 
is the circumference of a circle, and that 
the word "within" was used as a preposition 
in the sense that the whole territory embraced 
within the limits of the three hundred feet 
should be included. [10 ALR.2d 588, ap. 607.) 
* * * 
In construing 16-6-13.5 another factor to 
be considered is that prior t~l977, this 
section proscribed the establishment of 
licensed premises "in the immediate proxi-
mity of any existing school .••. " The 
amendment, in effect, specified by measure-
ment the meaning of "immediate proximity." 
* * * 
If the legislature so intended, it could have 
expressed the proscription by stating "where 
it is located within a straight line distance 
-5-
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of 600 feet from the boundary of any 
public or private school. 
Celebrity· Club Inc.· v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 
at pp. 692 and 693. 
The point of the Celebrity Club case is that 
definition of the protected area and the licensed premises 
had to be clarified by the court but the definition of the 
distance and its measurement in a straight line were 
clarified by the legislature previously and do not need 
to be reclarified or redefined now. 
Further, Petitioner urges that fences, buildings, 
and other obstructions are a practical, protective barrier 
which will force a circuitous route of travel. The argument 
fails in the face of the facts. As of the date of the latest 
inspection, the fence is down and the "shortest practical 
route" between the school and petitioner's restaurant is along 
the 540 foot measurement, door to door, or along the 330 foot 
line, property to property. 
The point is, even if the fence can be repaired, 
petitioner cannot guarantee the effectiveness or longevity of 
any barrier. However, the fence, or in this case, the lack 
of a fence, proves the wisdom of the legislature's language 
of " a radius of 600 feet ... " in a straight line measure-
ment. 
-6-
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Regarding the sale of liquor generally, the law in 
the United States is: 
In construing enactments prohibiting 
sale of intoxicants within a specified 
distance from certain establishments, 
most of the courts which have considered 
the problem have held that in the absence 
of any specific statutory provision governing 
the matter of measurement of distances, the 
distance is to be measured along the shortest 
straight line between the place where the 
liquor is to be sold and the other establish-
ment. 4 A.L.R. 3d 1250, at p. 1253. 
Cases to the contrary invariably result from specific 
statutory requirements such as the authority cited by petitioner 
in his brief. 
Florida Statutes: 
•.• no license .•. shall be granted to a 
vendor ••. whose place of business is 
within 2, 500 feet of an established 
church or school {which distance shall 
be measured by following the shortest 
route of ordinary pedestrian travel 
along the public thoroughfare from the 
main entrance of said place of business 
to the main entrance of the church) •.•• 
Section 561.44(2) Florida Statutes, 1961, 
-as cited in petitioner's brief at page 6. 
Kansas Statutes: 
IN]o license for the sale of alcoholic 
beveraqes at ·retail shall be issued for 
any premises that are located on the same 
street as, and within 200 feet of, a 
building used exclusively as a church 
or for classrooms of a school •.. the 
tne·a·s·u"rement ·sn:aT1· he taken in the Street 
on which the licensed premises are located. 
Kansas Revised Statutes, 243.220, as cited 
in petitioner's brief on page 5. 
-7-
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In the foregoing case the court allowed the liquor 
license, but it is interesting to note the court's further 
comment: 
It may or may not be ironical, but at 
the time of hearing before the Board, 
it had licensed approximately 17 other 
retail alcoholic beverage outlets on 
Main Street and Broadway all within 
200 feet of the church property according 
to the measurement it used in the present 
case. Hu·nt Club, "Inc. v. Moberly, 407 
S.W.2d 148 (1966). 
Thus, petitioner's authority advanced in support 
of its theory of circuitious travel arises only because -of 
the unique statutes of Florida and Kansas upon which the 
courts based their opinions. 
In conclusion of Point I, the Utah law is clear. 
The word "radius" in the Utah law means a straight line and 
when applied to a distance in a statute such as Utah's it 
indicates clearly a straight line distance which defines the 
extent of a circular area. In this case the law describes 
an area within which the Utah Liquor Control Commission has 
no authority or jurisdiction to allow a state liquor store. 
-8-
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POINT II 
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION HAS 
EXCLUSIVE DISe.Q£TION UNDER THE LAW TO 
DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF OUTLETS FOR 
THE SALE OF LIQUOR. 
Under the Utah Liquor Control Act the sale of 
liquor is legal only when made through official outlets 
designated as state stores on premises owned by the state 
or in the case of a restaurant, established on the restaurant 
premises by a lease. Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Annotated. 
Under the law the Commission is given exclusive authority 
to decide where a state store will be established: 
•.. The Conunission shall: 
* * * 
(b) Decide within the limits and 
under the conditions imposed by this 
act, the number and location of the 
stores and package agencies to be 
established in the state .. ~. 
Section 32-l-6(b), Utah Code Annotated. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has ruled 
before on the authority of the Commission regarding the 
establishment of state liquor stores. In a case where the 
Liquor Commission denied the applica~ion for establishment 
of a state store in a private club, this appellate court 
observed as follows: 
-9-
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The law does not require that whenever 
the county conrrnission has given its approval 
insofar as the county is concerned it become 
mandatory upon the Liquor Commission to 
grant the application. It seems obvious 
that if this were the law, the Liquor 
Commission would be deprived of the authority 
conferred upon it by Section 32-l-6(b) to 
"decide ... the number and location of the 
stores and package agencies to be established 
in the state." 
* * * 
... the state statute, Section 32-1-6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, having given the Com-
mission plenary power to decide the number 
and location of liquor stores took pre-
cedence over county zoning ordinances. 
Ro·gue v. · Utah Liquo·r Control Commission, 
500 p. 2d 509 (1972). 
Thus, under Utah law where the Commission has authority to 
establish stores it also has the discretion to not establish 
a store. That discretion must be allowed and observed under 
the law. 
It is submitted that the Legislature clearly 
,intended to limit the Commission's discretion and authority 
by its declaration that: 
No state store or package agency 
shall be established within a radius 
of 600 feet of any public or private 
school, church, library, public play-
ground or park •... Section 32-1-36.15 
(2) (a), Utah Code Annotated. 
The point is that the Commission has no authority to establish 
a state store within a radius of 600 feet of a school. Even 
-10-
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if the authority existed, the Commission in its discretion 
has the power to not establish such a state store. In that 
event the petitioner might attack the refusal for being 
arbitrary or capricious, but the argument would not be 
well taken in view of the plenary authority of the Com-
ission. 
In summary of Point II, the Commission's discretion 
should stand unless petitioner can carry the burden of showing 
that the Commission's decision is arbitrary or capricious or 
is beyond the Commission's authority: 
The burden was upon the plaintiff to 
show that the action of the Liquor Control 
Commission was beyond its authority or 
was capricious and arbitrary. Rc:igue v. 
Utah Liquo·r· co·ntrol· Commi·s·sion, 500 P.2d 
509, p. 511. 
Petitioner in this matter has not even alleged that 
the action of the Commission is arbitrary or capricious or 
beyond its authority. Nevertheless, it would seem that the 
Commission's discretion and authority are limited in that\1J-4'\0 
state store shall be allowed within a straight line radius 
of 600 feet of a school. 
CONCLUSION 
"Radius~" as used generally and i~ the Utah statute, 
is susceptible of no other meaning than a straight line intended 
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to define the extent of a circular area within which the Utah 
Liquor Control Commission has no authority to establish a 
state liquor store. Any authority to the contrary from other 
states turns on express language of particular statutes which 
clearly require the measurement in that state to be made 
according to circuitous pedestrian traffic. 
Respondent submits that unless the action of the 
Commission can be shown in some way to be arbitrary or capri-
cious or in some way beyond its authority, the action must 
stand. There has been no such showing in this case. 
To the contrary it would seem that to allow a liquor 
store within the area of legal proscription would be arbitrary 
or capricious and an action which could seriously be challenged 
as clearly beyond the authority of the Commission. 
Respondent therefore respectfully requests that this 
court uphold the action of the Commission of April 11, 1980, 
wherein the application for the establishment of a liquor 
store in petitioner's premises was denied. 
DATED this ~ day of August, 1980. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. McALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
-12-
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